INTRODUCTION
In the early 1980s, the Federal Government responded to the rapid expansion in Medicaid program spending by taking a more decentralized approach to Medicaid administration. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts (OBRAs) of 1980 and 1981 gave States more flexibility in setting eligibility criteria, service coverage, and reimbursement methods. Such a policy was not without its risks, however.
First, and most important, States vary systematically in their attitudes about extending health care to their indigent populations. Hawaii, Michigan, California, and Wisconsin, for example, all enrolled more than 85 percent of their poverty-level populations in Medicaid in 1982 compared with less than 25 percent in Wyoming, Idaho, and South Dakota (Cromwell, Hurdle, and Schurman, 1987) . With fewer Federal restrictions, State enrollments fell considerably in 1981 and 1982 during a time when unemployment reached record postDepression levels, raising serious questions about the adequacy of the public "safety net" (Cromwell, Hurdle, and Wedig, 1986) .
A second risk of granting more program authority to the States is the extreme variation in State taxpayer burdens in spite of a Federal matching arrangement designed to help poorer States. Keying on per capita income instead of a more accurate measure of State tax capacity, the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) spans too narrow a range to assure program equity to State taxpayers. In 1981, for example, New York spent $16 of its own money out of every $100 of taxable capacity on Medicaid versus only $2 in Florida (Cromwell, Hurdle, and Schurman, 1987) , even though Florida enjoyed a slightly higher tax base per capita. When confronted with a declining economy and tax bases, Medicaid-burdened States sought ways of limiting their programs that hindered equal access to health care for poorer Americans.
Frustrated by falling enrollments in the early 1980s, Congress enacted a series of mandated enrollment and reimbursement laws. The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 required States to extend coverage to firsttime pregnant women and infants in poor families. Subsequent OBRAs and the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 continued to expand eligibility to low-income pregnant women and children. They also required States to offer coverage to unemployed parents and their families, to continue coverage to women and children after leaving the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, and to pay Medicare premiums, deductibles, and copayments of the poor elderly. States were also required to increase payments to obstetricians to ensure reasonable access to maternity care and to ensure adequate and fair reimbursement to hospitals (under the Boren amendment of 1981). Although the mandates had direct cost implications, the fact that States were given greater flexibility in enrolling their poor without necessarily offering them cash welfare softened the financial blow somewhat on taxpayers. Limiting Medicaid enrollment to those receiving cash welfare had been a serious deterrent to States' willingness to expand their programs in the past
The primary goal of this article is to determine the impact of the various mandates on the equity of the Medicaid program during the 1980s. Specifically, we will document trends in the breadth of Medicaid eligibility, as measured by the coverage rate (enrollments per person in poverty). Next, we document trends in the depth of coverage in terms of optional services, utilization limits, and real spending per enrollee. We then construct a typology of State Medicaid programs in 1990, based on their breadth versus depth of coverage, and compare the resulting classification with our earlier study using 1982 data. To examine the impacts of the mandates on taxpayers, we present levels and trends in State taxpayer burdens for Medicaid from 1975 to 1991. We then estimate a program/taxpayer equity parameter and compare it with an earlier estimate for 1981. Because several States adopted providerspecific tax and voluntary donation (T&D) schemes by 1991, we adjust State-specific spending to test whether such schemes resulted in more equal taxpayer burdens. In the final analysis, we bring State Medicaid generosity to the poor together with taxpayer burden to show the limitations of the current Federal matching algorithm. In particular, we simulate the changes that would have to occur in each State's FMAP to achieve, simultaneously, both equity to the poor (in terms of real spending) and to the taxpayer (in terms of equal tax burdens).
TRENDS IN THE BREADTH OF MEDICAID COVERAGE
The number of Medicaid person-yearequivalent (PYE) 1 enrollees has grown over 60 percent since 1975, from slightly over 17 million to 27.4 million in 1992. This growth has been a function of changes in eligibility requirements over time and the growing number of poor in America.
Eligibility Requirements
Consider, first, the changes brought about by income restrictions. Medicaid coverage is divided into two broad groups: the categorically needy and the medically needy. Originally, the former were defined as those people who received cash payments through AFDC and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). These maintenance assistance groups corresponded to poor families with children and the aged, blind, and disabled, respectively. With the implementation of the Medicaid expansions, certain individuals who do not receive cash payments through AFDC or SSI are now considered categorically needy, including pregnant women and infants (up to 133 percent of the Federal poverty level [FPL] ), and children living in families up to 100 percent of the FPL born after September 30, 1983. States are now also required to enroll and pay the Medicare premiums, deductibles, and copayments of qualified Medicare beneficiaries, Medicare recipients whose income is less than 100 percent of the FPL and whose resources do not exceed two times the SSI resource standard. The medically needy are those individuals who do not qualify for cash payments from either AFDC or SSI, but qualify for Medicaid under optional Federal laws because their medical expenses leave them impoverished.
Prior to the Federal mandates of the 1980s, breadth of Medicaid coverage was determined almost exclusively by States through their control of eligibility standards for AFDC cash assistance. The Federal mandates, by unlinking eligibility and cash welfare, took some control away from States and required enrollment of specific populations, e.g., poor children. However, each State still sets its own income and asset standards for determining eligibility for AFDC and coverage of their medically needy population, and therefore retains a large measure of control over the breadth of Medicaid coverage. Table 1 shows that, from 1980 to 1992, the AFDC payment standard decreased for all but two States (Alaska and Georgia) after adjusting for inflation. Furthermore, the mean payment fell 23 percent overall in real terms. States with the greatest decline in payment standards include Virginia (45 percent), Oregon (43 percent), and Idaho (43 percent). Twelve States spent more than $500 a month on an AFDC family of 3 in 1992, while another 14 States allowed less than $300. Declining real payment standards implies fewer Medicaid eligibles over time.
One explanation for declining cash welfare is the substitution of in-kind Federal food stamps for discretionary income (Moffitt, 1990) . States realized that they could reduce cash payments, as the food stamp program met one of the most important needs of the poor. Further, since the mandated expansions of the mid-1980s, States have had little motivation to increase the AFDC income requirements to guarantee health care coverage for the poor. A subset of the expansion population (i.e., pregnant women and children) that would have been eligible through AFDC if States updated their payment standards for inflation could now be covered without extending welfare to them as well.
Since 1984, eligibility requirements for pregnant women, infants, and children have undergone many changes marking the beginning of the break with AFDClinked eligibility. With OBRA 1986, Federal poverty guidelines (based on the FPL) were used to supplement State-defined AFDC standards in defining Medicaid eligibility for pregnant women, infants, and children. Although these provisions were optional in OBRAs 1986 OBRAs and 1987 OBRAs , starting in 1988 , Congress mandated coverage for qualifying pregnant women, infants, and children using the FPL standards. The Federal Government provided matching Medicaid funds to these new eligibles without States having to offer cash welfare as well, somewhat reducing their financial burden.
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Enrollment Trends
Given the mandates and expansion in the medically needy program, it is not surprising that non-cash enrollees grew 203 percent from 1975 to 1992 (with a 109-percent increase from 1988 to 1992 alone). Despite negative growth in real AFDC payment levels, cash enrollees still experienced slow growth over time (22.5 percent over the 1975-92 period) .
The national Medicaid coverage rate (enrollment per 100 poor persons) increased 3.5 percent from 1982 to 1990 (Table 2) . To obtain the proportion of Medicaid-covered poor in a State, Medicaid enrollees were used as the numerator while the State population below the adjusted poverty level served as the denominator. The number of poor in the State was adjusted to reflect State-specific cost-ofliving differences (available from authors upon request). As was the case in overall enrollment growth, there is considerable variation in the level and rate of improvement in State coverage rates. Medically needy programs also expanded by an average of four services from 1980 to 1991. Sixteen States added dental services, 12 added rehabilitative services, and 11 expanded to include optometrist and other practitioner services. Of the 17 States whose medically needy protected income was greater than $500, 13 offered at least 22 optional services. Conversely, for the 6 States whose medically needy protected income was below $300, none offered more than 20 optional services.
Generosity in the number of optional services offered by a State reflects systematic regional differences. States offering 25 or more of the optional services to the categorically needy fall primarily on the west coast and in the North. There is a belt of less generous States ranging from Idaho to Texas and throughout the South.
A mechanism that some States have used to control Medicaid outlays is to place a ceiling on mandated services. In the 1980s, when forced to implement new mandates that expanded the breadth of Medicaid coverage, States might have been expected to reduce the number of inpatient hospital days eligible for reimbursement. Despite rising fiscal pressures, however, the number of States choosing to Of the 12 States with the highest payments per enrollee (quartile I), 7 were among the top 10 most generous in terms of the number of optional services offered to the categorically needy. Five of these States also offered at least 26 optional services to the medically needy. Conversely, 7 of the 12 States in quartile IV offered fewer than 18 optional services to the categorically needy and 5 of these States did not offer a medically needy program. Exceptions include California, which offered 28 of the 29 optional services to both the categorically and medically needy, yet falls at the low end of quartile IV in real payments per enrollee. Also, South Dakota, which had the fourth highest real payments per enrollee in the United States, offered relatively few optional services to the categorically needy and has no medically needy program.
A TYPOLOGY OF MEDICAID PROGRAMS
Total real Medicaid spending per person in poverty (MEX/P/Poor) reflects the overall generosity of the program and can be decomposed into the product of two ratios depicting breadth and depth of coverage:
Equation
where ENR/POOR, enrollees per poor (i.e., coverage rate), is our measure of breadth, and MEX/P/ENR, price-adjusted total spending per enrollee, is our measure of depth. From the enrollee's perspective, it is the real services they receive, not their ultimate costs to taxpayers (analyzed later), that count. To avoid categorizing a program as "deep coverage" simply because it pays high prices to providers, we deflate total expenditures using a Medicaid-specific price deflator for each State. The Medicaid price deflator is derived from HCFA Form-2082 expenditure and utilization data for hospitals, nursing homes, and physician services.
Depth of coverage can also be influenced by the States' demographic mix, as older persons use more health services. No adjustment was made for enrollee mix, however, for two reasons. First, broader programs will tend to enroll fewer sick persons at the margin, resulting in a natural trade-off of depth for breadth that is part of the typology. Second, to the extent States differ in their underlying demographic mix, we wanted to capture any effects this may have in program depth and breadth. Adjustments for mix are made in subsequent analyses of taxpayer burden to account for the greater financial requirements of the elderly and disabled. Figure 1 plots the State programs as of 1990 in terms of their coverage rate (y-axis) and depth of real spending per enrollee (xaxis). For a given level of overall program generosity to the poor, k*, breadth and depth trade off against each other. When States appearing above the ray extending from the origin through the U.S. coordinates are relatively more generous to potential eligibles by enrolling more of the poor (i.e., these States are enrollmentbiased). States below the U.S. ray can be said to be more generous to those deemed eligible (i.e., depth-biased). States falling along any ray from the origin exhibit similar breadth-depth preferences.
Considering Figure 2 divides States into four quadrants based on median breadth and depth thresholds. States that refuse to tradeoff depth for breadth of coverage and thus spend relatively more per poor person appear in quadrant I; States offering relatively limited programs for the poor are in quadrant IV; and States that opt for depth over breadth or the reverse are in quadrants II and III, respectively.
The nine uniformly generous States in quadrant I exhibit a far higher percentage of medically needy recipients than among the other three groups, as expected. They also have a slightly higher percentage receiving AFDC cash welfare than States with more limited breadth of coverage (quadrants II and IV). Their range of optional services, by contrast, is not exceptional.
States with uniformly low breadth and depth in quadrant IV have very few medically needy recipients. And for those 2 Programs falling along any iso-expenditure line in Figure 1 do not necessarily spend the same per poor person in nominal terms, because spending has been adjusted in a number of ways. Nevertheless, a high correlation exists between iso-expenditure lines in Figure 1 and actual spending per poor person. Figure 2 is the quadrant in which they placed in 1982 (Cromwell, Hurdle, and Schurman, 1987) . Some States were missing data for the earlier year and are left blank. Uniformly generous quadrant I States appear quite stable across the 1980s. Connecticut and Hawaii have joined the group by raising their depth of spending per enrollee. The District of Columbia and Massachusetts moved to quadrant III and II, respectively.
By contrast, only 3 of the 10 States now in quadrant IV were there in 1982: Alabama, Florida, and New Mexico. Several quadrant II States with traditionally low enrollee coverage rates slipped down to IV by reducing their depth of coverage, at least in relative terms. These States were primarily located in the Southwest and Rocky Mountain regions.
States with minimal programs in 1982 that did change tended to move equally into quadrants II and III. Idaho, South Carolina, and Virginia, by 1990, spent more than average on enrollees (although still not offering broad eligibility) while Georgia, Kentucky, and Mississippi greatly expanded eligibility but not depth. No quadrant IV State moved into quadrant I, or vice-versa.
MEDICAID TAXPAYER BURDEN

Defining Taxpayer Burden
One reason why States vary so much in their level of Medicaid spending is that they do not all have equal abilities to pay for the program. It should be easier for a rich State to cover a larger fraction of its poor population, offering them the gamut of Medicaid services, than it is for a poor State to cover even a small number of enrollees with limited service benefits.
Taxpayer burden can be evaluated with regard to overall horizontal and vertical equity (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1989 Vertical equity is a more stringent condition based on the principle that richer States should spend disproportionately more on Medicaid than poorer States. Wealthier taxpayers are assumed to sacrifice less per tax dollar than their poorer neighbors, and hence, should be willing and able to spend more on Medicaid (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1989) . Vertical equity requires that richer States allocate a larger fraction of State income to the program, so that Medicaid tax efforts rise more than proportionately with income or wealth (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1983). Despite Federal efforts to equalize tax burdens through FMAP, there are several reasons why they may still vary dramatically across States. The first is that the upper and lower bounds placed on the Federal matching rate are too restrictive to achieve taxpayer equity, a point that was well-documented in 1983 by the U.S. General Accounting Office and again in 1993. Second, even if the FMAP fully compensated for State differences in wealth, differences in taxpayer preferences for Medicaid would still exist, and, in the absence of Federal regulations such as coverage mandates, program differences would arise. But this is exactly the kind of variation we are trying to capture, i.e., State taxpayer's Medicaid generosity over and above differences attributable to ability to pay or State wealth.
Role of the FMAP
Data, Sources, and Methods
To quantify taxpayer burdens, Medicaid spending data were developed from HCFA Form-2082 data files. Because we are interested in each State's own tax burden, Federal Medicaid payments have been subtracted from total program expenditures using the following formula Since 1985, the use of (T&D) programs by States has distorted the financing relationship between the States and the Federal Government. States with T&D programs can raise their effective FMAP rate and increase total Medicaid spending without raising additional State revenues or reallocating funds. Typically, States with these schemes increase payments to 3 HCFA Form-2082 data include only direct spending on independent medical vendors. They exclude most disproportionate share payments to public hospitals and all program administrative costs; hence, the figures shown later in Table 5 support public services. The tax yield is estimated using a standard, representative national set of tax base definitions and tax rates in every State applied to a tax base that includes personal and corporate profits, sales taxes, property values, minerals, etc. Tax capacity represents the potential dollar yield of a "nationally representative" set of tax rates for each State and can be thought of as a weighted sum of a State's tax bases, based on national average tax rates for each tax base. The tax-generating capabilities of a State's tax bases is a more accurate measure of the taxpayer's ability to support government spending than per capita income, which is only one of many tax bases.
ACIR reports a State's tax capacity by dividing the State's per capita capacity by the national average per capita capacity and multiplying by 100. The results show the potential taxable income of each State indexed to the national average for a given year. If a State's tax base grows at the same rate as the U.S. average, its end-period index will be identical to its base-period index, with no apparent growth; however, its actual tax capacity has grown at the national rate. ACIR-indexed measures of tax capacity, therefore, understate the growth in any one State's tax bases. Another problem in using ACIR tax capacities is that each year's tax bases are weighted by a contemporaneous set of national tax rates. With rising tax rates over time, this produces an upward bias in the trend in tax bases.
To estimate the growth in nominal State tax capacities, or more specifically, tax bases, the annual U.S. tax capacity reported by ACIR was adjusted, first, by multiplying each State's tax bases each year by a vector of 1979 tax rates in order to control for tax rate increases over time, then suming across all States. Next, each State's annual tax capacity was de-indexed by multiplying it by the per capita adjusted tax capacity for the entire country in a given year. 
Trends in Taxpayer Burden
Medicaid Equity Parameter
To show how much equity in the Medicaid tax burden existed in 1991, State-only per capita Medicaid expenditures were plotted against per capita tax capacity ( Figure 3 and Table 6 ). The scatter plot shows minimal horizontal equity. Despite the numerous outliers in Figure  3 , some overall progressivity in Medicaid program financing appears to exist. Using ordinary least squares, we regressed per capita Medicaid spending on per capita tax capacity, both in logs, and plotted the relationship on Figure 3 . Our estimated equity coefficient is 1.21, (t-statistic = 3.53; R 2 = 0.19) implying that for every 1-percent increase in the typical State's per capita tax capacity, State-specific Medicaid spending rises 1.21 percent. The coefficient of vertical equity for 1991 was slightly higher than the 1.15 figure estimated for 1981 (Cromwell, Hurdle, and Schurman, 1987) . This amounts to a 5-percent increase in the elasticity of State-specific spending with respect to greater tax capacity over 10 years. However, vertical equity declined since 1988, when the estimated equity coefficient was 1.54. During the 3 years in which Medicaid cost increases were most significant, vertical equity appears to have declined 21 percent, although richer States still spend disproportionately more of their own money on Medicaid compared with poorer States.
We also regressed 1991 per capita Medicaid spending, adjusted for T&D schemes, on per capita tax capacity. The estimated coefficient increased to 1.27. The higher coefficient indicates that States' adoption of provider T&D schemes improved vertical equity slightly-at least in 1991.
ACHIEVING PROGRAM EQUITY THROUGH FMAP
States clearly vary greatly along two key dimensions: equity to the poor in terms of Medicaid breadth and depth of coverage, and equity to taxpayers in terms of the program's financial burden. Can government policymakers achieve greater equity along both dimensions simultaneously using the policy instruments at their disposal?
Eliminating inequities represents an important policy objective to those who feel that both the poor, who enjoy the benefits, and taxpayers, who ultimately support the Medicaid program, should be treated equally no matter where they live.
Conceptual Approach
Grannemann and Pauly (1983) show how it is possible to simultaneously achieve horizontal equity to both recipients and taxpayers through a revised set of Federal cost-sharing rates (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1993). First, define is a recipient costliness index to adjust State spending for differences in the health status of the poor (described below); POOR s is the number of poor people in the 5th State; and B* equals a predetermined optimal level of Medicaid benefits, assumed constant across all States to achieve horizontal equity to recipients. In comparing State spending on the poor, two adjustments are important. First, higher service prices (or payment rates) must be removed from expenditures in order to compare real services used by the poor across States. Second, States vary in the demographic characteristics of the poor in ways that affect spending. Wyoming, for example, has a mix of recipients that is 21 percent less costly than the national average. Dividing spending by the recipient costliness index as well as prices adjusts for important mix differences that would distort comparisons of horizontal equity. Each State's costliness index was constructed by weighting a State's own recipient proportions by national per recipient expenditures among the aged, the blind and disabled, AFDC adults, and AFDC children. The resulting adjusted recipient average cost was then indexed by dividing by the national average cost per recipient in 1990. Alabama, for example, exhibited the most costly recipient mix, 31 percent above average, while Alaska's mix was 28 percent less costly on average. See Cromwell et al. (1994) for a more detailed description. 
where
Eqaution
For fixed prices, poverty rates, recipient mixes, and tax capacity in each State in a given year, it is theoretically possible to establish a set of FMAP s that solve equation 7, effectively translating equity to the poor (B*) into perfect horizontal equity to taxpayers as well. Equal B* and TE* across States imply that the poor would all receive the same real level of services while taxpayers in every State would be equally burdened in achieving uniform spending on the poor. This is a necessary condition for achieving equity-and the only one considered by Grannemann and Pauly (1983) Figure 4 and the R 2 would be 1.0 (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1983). With 74 percent of the variation unexplained, con siderable inequity remains in the program, even applying the "weaker" horizontal equity criterion.
The overall relationship between tax payer burden and generosity to the poor is unequivocally positive, suggesting that States offering a generous Medicaid pro gram to their indigent populations do so by bearing a larger Medicaid tax burden. New York represents the most extreme exam ple, spending 1.7 times in real terms what the average State spends per person in poverty ($3,115 versus $1,806) , at 3.6 times the cost to taxpayers. In contrast, West Virginia, Nevada, New Mexico, and Alabama all spent less than 60 percent of the U.S. average on the poor, while bearing relatively low tax burdens for Medicaid.
If FMAP completely offset systematic differences in medical care prices, poverty rates, recipient mix differences, and State wealth, then all States would fall on the line in Figure 4 and vertical equity would 
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be achieved in the U.S. General Accounting Office framework. For States above the line, their FMAPs are "too high" given their economic factors. That is, the Federal Government shares too much with taxpayers in order to achieve a particular overall spending level on the poor. From Figure 4 , excessive FMAPs would appear to be the case for States such as Massachusetts, Connecticut, Minnesota, and Arkansas. Conversely, FMAPs are too low in California, Mississippi, and the District of Columbia, among others, to offset high medical care prices, poverty rates, and/or low tax capacities in order to achieve a "national" level of real Medicaid benefits per poor person in the State. An interesting question is whether some States are above the line because of burdensome tax efforts to provide "average" levels of health services or because their eligibles are using services at a much higher rate than in other States.
FMAP Simulations
What Federal matching rates would be required to allow every State to purchase the same real services for the poor at equal tax burdens, thereby achieving perfect horizontal equity? Although an unrealistic scenario, the degree of change in FMAP s is illustrative of how far the system deviates from what many would argue is a desirable goal. The answer can be determined by solving equation 7 for FMAP, substituting into equation 6, then inserting the desired levels of spending (B*) and taxpayer burden (TE*). The simulation equation is
To conduct the simulation, we set TE* = 0.0662 and B* = $1,884, the populationweighted U.S. averages. Equation 11 will simulate the necessary FMAPs that allow each State to offer the U.S. real Medicaid spending per person or $1,884 while, at the same time, imposing $6.22 per $100 or tax capacity onto each State's taxpayers under the (admittedly unrealistic) assumption of no changes in State programs. 4 Given these fixed values, States with higher tax capacities or lower medical prices or lower poverty rates will require lower FMAPs to achieve the dual equality goals. Book, 1990. would lower its own spending on Medicaid per tax dollar (= .092) more than enough to bring its taxpayer burden down to $6.22 per $100 of tax capacity. To achieve horizontal equity, the State would have to pick up more than 100 percent of the $1,884, a quite unrealistic outcome.
A few large States appear to win under the dual-equality criterion, including California and New York. Californians spend slightly less than the national average per tax dollar but purchase much less than the national average bundle of services for its poor, due largely to high medical care prices. It would need a higher FMAP to substantially raise real spending on the poor. The District of Columbia would also enjoy a large jump in its Federal matching rate. In New York's case, even if it reduced its spending from $3,115 to $1,884, it still would experience a higher-than-average tax burden, requiring a small (1.1 percentage point) increase in its FMAP.
Clearly, such broad redistributions of Federal Medicaid dollars would be politically infeasible, nor are they desirable given the likely State cutbacks. Applying any vertical equity criterion would only have made matters worse. What the numbers do show is the enormous disparity in State generosity to the poor in the current program. They also point to "excessive" Federal sharing either because a State's tax capacity would support more State spending (e.g., Nevada) or a State's level of real spending on the poor is out of line with most other States (e.g., Minnesota and Wisconsin).
DISCUSSION
The Medicaid program is now almost 30 years old. Established as a complement to the long-established welfare system, the program has grown so rapidly that it now dwarfs cash outlays to the poor. In hindsight, the program has been plagued by technical problems and inconsistent goals on the part of the Congress and State legislatures. These have led to increasingly intrusive direction from Washington as Congress grapples with the growing number of uninsured in America. Here we review some of the more salient flaws in the way the system is currently structured and suggest some improvements.
Research presented in this article and elsewhere has documented broad ideological differences across States in the value of extending health care coverage (along with cash welfare) to the Nation's poor. The Congress recognized these differences at the beginning by mandating a minimum set of eligibility criteria and covered services to ensure reasonable access to care. Since the early 1980s, however, the social experiment allowing States more flexibility in setting eligibility criteria has shown that the majority of voters choose to limit coverage of the poor as one means of controlling State budgets. Federal matching funds were not enough to overcome such preferences, and Congress, representing a broader national constituency, chose to mandate expanded eligibility to cope with the growing numbers of uninsured poor. As the number of poor and uninsured grew because of higher and higher private insurance premiums, Washington found itself taking greater (instead of lesser) control over State enrollment and service decisions. Furthermore, simulations by Grannemann and Pauly (1983) confirm the conclusions that States will drastically cut eligibility and spending under block grants.
The Federal Government shares in the program's current inequities to the poor and to taxpayers. Several problems have been identified with the way Federal matching rates are calculated. For one, the sliding scale is based on an imperfect measure of the ability of State taxpayers to support their own government. Per capita income has two important drawbacks. First, it does not adequately capture certain tax bases available to States, such as property values, corporate profits, and mineral extraction. Second, and possibly even more problematic, per capita income is relatively insensitive to short-run swings in the business cycle. State economies vary more than the national economy. Hence, to smooth out the Medicaid burden on local taxpayers and ensure continuous coverage of the poor, it is imperative that the Federal Government have a sharing arrangement that responds quickly to local downturns. The ACIR measure of tax capacity used in this article is preferred in this regard.
Another problem with the Federal sharing algorithm is that it covers too narrow a range to ensure horizontal or vertical tax equity across States. Our simulations show that a very large range of matching rates would be necessary to achieve perfect (or even near perfect) horizontal equity. The fact that this is politically infeasible points to the inconsistent goals of satisfying both the members of Congress and assuring equal access to health care for the poor across the country through the Stateadministered Medicaid program. Indeed, it is impossible through a set of FMAPs alone to achieve Federal goals of equal access and taxpayer equity while satisfying State voters (Grannemann and Pauly, 1983) . Any significant changes in Federal matching rates will inevitably lead to cutbacks in coverage and/or services in some States that may already be less generous to the poor.
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For those who would question whether large inequalities in State coverage of the poor are undesirable if they reflect true differences in voter preferences, the problem of interstate migration in search of better health care raises equity and efficiency questions (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1989) . Is health care a "right" of the poor? If not, then why is health care extended uniformly to all elderly through the Federal Medicare program? Are non-elderly poor different? If so, why do the poor (and others) become deserving at age 65? These are challenging questions that cannot be addressed solely by tinkering with Federal matching rates.
A third drawback with the sharing algorithm is that it fails to take into consideration demographic and distributional factors important in determining taxpayer burden. The poor in the 50 States are not all the same, nor are their numbers linked perfectly with State per capita income. Wyoming, for example, has many fewer female-headed households, or aged, blind, or disabled. It also has relatively few poor (11 percent in 1990 ). Yet, its Federal matching rate in 1990 was 69 percent based on its per capita income. Wyoming, and many other States, need less Federal support because their mix of poor is less likely to be categorically eligible.
Yet another weakness of the sharing arrangement is the opportunity for States to creatively finance their programs using T&D schemes. Although we find evidence that such schemes enhanced overall program equity in 1991, they did so at a great cost to the Federal Government-far greater than would have been necessary with more targeted changes in the underlying matching rates.
In sum, the Federal strategy of matching Medicaid State funding using a sliding rate based on income has failed to accomplish the national goals originally set out for the Medicaid program. The poor still do not enjoy the access to health care or the level of insurance coverage of wealthier Americans intended in the enabling legislation, nor do taxpayers in the States contribute equitably to the poor's health care according to their true ability to pay. The Congress has chosen to mandate more and more coverage and services; States have responded to increasing fiscal pressures by creatively financing the program out of Federal funds. As the funding loopholes are closed, States will be forced to find other ways of paying for the mandates. How much of the burden will fall inequitably on taxpayers and how much on the level and quality of medical care offered the poor remains to be seen.
It is clear by now that health care coverage of the poor must be divorced from welfare eligibility. The Congress has admitted as much by requiring major expansions without requiring States to offer cash welfare as well. Applying Federal poverty standards to all potential eligibles, regardless of age or gender, would promote greater equity to the poor across States.
In addition, the Federal Government should take more financial responsibility for evening out the taxpayer burden. This requires switching bases from per capita income to tax capacity, as recommended by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations and the U.S. General Accounting Office. Tax capacity would have to be updated yearly (it is currently recalculated every 2-3 years) and the sliding scale widened somewhat to redistribute more funds to heavily burdened States, although not necessarily to the extent implied by our simulations. In redistributing funds, however, care should be taken to adjust for higher medical care prices in some States and to avoid overfunding excessively lavish programs in others. Our simulations have shown that Federal sharing rates would fall in some States that spend exceptional amounts per poor person compared with the national average. If States choose to provide broader coverage of the poor than nationally determined using Federal poverty standards, or to offer deeper coverage, then they should pay the full costs instead of enjoying at least 50 percent matching of their outlays regardless of the needs of the poor in other States.
